Leaking of confidential material is a major threat to information security within organizations and to society as a whole. This\r\ninsight has gained traction in the political realm since the activities of Wikileaks, which hopes to attack ââ?¬Ë?unjustââ?¬â?¢ systems or\r\nââ?¬Ë?conspiraciesââ?¬â?¢. Eventually, such threats to information security rely on a biologistic argument on the benefits and drawbacks\r\nthat uncontrolled leaking might pose for ââ?¬Ë?justââ?¬â?¢ and ââ?¬Ë?unjustââ?¬â?¢ entities. Such biological metaphors are almost exclusively based\r\non the economic advantage of participants. Here, I introduce a mathematical model of the complex dynamics implied by\r\nleaking. The complex interactions of adversaries are modeled by coupled logistic equations including network effects of\r\necono-communication networks. The modeling shows, that there might arise situations where the leaking envisioned and\r\nencouraged by Wikileaks and the like can strengthen the defending entity (the ââ?¬Ë?conspiracyââ?¬â?¢). In particular, the only severe\r\nimpact leaking can have on an organization seems to originate in the exploitation of leaks by another entity the\r\norganization competes with. Therefore, the model suggests that leaks can be used as atactical meanââ?¬â?¢ in direct adversary\r\nrelations, but do not necessarily increase public benefit and societal immunization to ââ?¬Ë?conspiraciesââ?¬â?¢. Furthermore, within the\r\nmodel the exploitation of the (open) competition between entities seems to be a more promising approach to control\r\nmalicious organizations : divide-et-impera policies triumph here.
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